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State Inspection 
Jeremy Waldron* 
How should we think about the harm caused by hate speech?  Does 
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s “clear and present danger” test provide an 
appropriate framework for evaluating such harms?  I think not, and I 
would like to begin with an analogy.  
A week ago, I received an email advising me that the required 
annual New York State Inspection for my aged Subaru must take place 
by July 31, 2020.  The notice commanded me to take the car to a licensed 
inspection station to have it checked for, among other things, a properly 
functioning emissions-control system.  This is a nuisance and it costs 
money, even if the car passes the inspection.  And if it does not pass, 
modifications and repairs to the emissions system can be quite 
expensive.  Still, the test and the remedies for defects are required by 
law.  They are required because nothing but ensuring that all vehicles 
have good working emissions systems can abate the danger posed by 
the accumulation of pollutants from millions of individual vehicles. 
New York State is obligated to require all this under the auspices of 
the federal Clean Air Act.1  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
which administers that legislation, says the following in one of its 
pamphlets on emissions: 
Emissions from an individual car are generally low, relative to 
the smokestack image many people associate with air 
pollution.  But in numerous cities across the country, the 
personal automobile is the single greatest polluter, as 
emissions from millions of vehicles on the road add up.  
Driving a private car is probably a typical citizen’s most 
“polluting” daily activity.2  
 
*University Professor, New York University School of Law. 
 1 Emissions testing rules in New York are set out in Regulations of the 
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (Part 79, Motor Vehicle Inspection), N.Y. COMP. CODES R. 
& REGS. tit.15, § 79 (2020), as authorized and required under section 301(d) of the 
Vehicle and Traffic Law, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 301(d) (Consol. 2020).  That is in turn 
required under Title II of the federal Clean Air Act.  
 2 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AUTOMOBILE EMISSIONS: AN OVERVIEW 1 (1994), 
https://www.wisconsinvip.org/WivipPublic/PDF/Downloads/2_2_4.pdf.  
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So here is my question: can I legitimately complain about the State 
Inspection requirement because—as the EPA acknowledges—the level 
of pollution caused by my car, or any individual car, is rather low even 
if its emissions system is broken?  In and of itself, the operation of my 
Subaru poses no significant emissions hazard to anyone.  There must be 
thousands of such cars with non-working emissions systems before 
there is discernable danger.  So would I be justified in calling for the 
repeal of the relevant statutes and regulations because of the 
unwarranted burden they impose person-by-person on individual car-
owners?  
We all know that such a response would be silly.  As a society, we 
collectively face dangers of air quality deterioration, carbon monoxide 
poisoning, and lead toxicity, not to mention the greenhouse gas effects 
of CO2.  The fact that these dangers are not singularly caused by the 
isolated acts of individuals considered on their own is not a reason to 
refrain from abating them.  There is no way to deal with these dangers 
except by restrictions on drivers like me.  The danger is real, each car 
contributes, and emissions from large numbers of exhaust pipes add up.  
Nothing but restrictions on thousands of cars like mine—requiring 
testing and working emissions-control systems—offers any prospect of 
averting the danger.  
The temptation is to think that since regulation bears down upon 
the behavior of individuals one-by-one, an individual should be 
regulated only with respect to the harm caused specifically by his or her 
actions.  It is unjust, we might have said, to hold A liable for something 
done by B.  But if the similar actions of A and B and C (and thousands of 
others) add up to a hazard, H, that impacts adversely on public health 
generally, there may be no way of abating H except by regulating A’s 
actions considered in light of B’s and C’s, and B’s actions considered in 
light of A’s and C’s, and C’s actions considered in light of A’s and B’s, and 
so on.  An individualized focus on A’s actions alone, without reference to 
the accumulation of its effects with the effects of the actions of B and C, 
will leave H unabated and many people considerably worse off as a 
result.  
Even moral philosophers now understand this.  The 1984 
publication of Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons marked a turning 
point in consequentialist analysis.3  Parfit named Chapter Three “Five 
Mistakes in Moral Mathematics.”  Among the mistakes he diagnosed 
were “[i]gnoring the [e]ffects of [s]ets of [a]ctions” and “[i]gnoring 
[s]mall or [i]mperceptible [e]ffects.”  As to the first, he wrote that “[i]t is 
 
 3 DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984). 
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natural to assume . . . [that] [i]f some act is right or wrong because of its 
effects, the only relevant effects are the effects of this particular act.”4  
But he invited us to consider cases, familiar to theorists of criminal law 
and tort law, where several people acting independently have an impact 
on a single individual, resulting in an injury whose severity cannot be 
attributed to any one of them alone.5  And as to the second, he posited a 
case in which an individual is tortured by having the electric current on 
an apparatus turned up gradually by imperceptible increments, 
thousands of which cumulate into the infliction of agonizing pain.6  A 
single torturer turns the increment switch again and again until the 
victim is screaming in pain.  Can the torturer defend himself against the 
charge of torture by saying that nothing he did in any one of his actions 
had a discernible effect upon the victim?  Or put the two cases together: 
Each of a thousand torturers turns his switch once to increase the 
current by a tiny amount.  If they understand the situation, are they not 
all of them complicit in a set of actions that has dire consequences?  Or 
can they take refuge in absence of any direct and clear causal line 
extending from what each does individually to what the victim 
eventually suffers?  Parfit’s hypotheticals are curious in their 
substance,7 but the moral is clear: When we consider the consequential 
significance of what we do, we must take into account the actions of 
many individuals.  The consequences of these collective actions can 
result in a harm, the magnitude and importance of which is belied by 
focusing on each person’s behavior, considered under the auspices of 
older and cruder models of causation.  
In the pollution cases, the accumulation of overall harm takes place 
over more than one dimension.  The effects that H comprises may be an 
accumulation across thousands of individual actions occurring 
simultaneously.  Toxins in the air breathed by children in an urban 
playground may be the result of thousands of vehicles operating in the 
vicinity on a given morning.  Or H may build up slowly over time: the 
toxins present in a town’s water supply may be the result of years of 
pollution—again at a level that is barely perceptible considered as an 
individual effect—by vehicles driving at or near that town.  Once the 
responsible authorities become aware of the danger and its causes, they 
can intervene with regulation and controls to make it less likely that the 
 
 4 Id. at 70, 75.  
 5 See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1948) (establishing doctrine of alternative 
liability). 
 6 See PARFIT, supra note 3, at 80–82. 
 7 For doubts about some of Parfit’s hypotheticals, see Kristin Shrader-Frechette, 
Parfit and Mistakes in Moral Mathematics, 98 ETHICS 50 (1987). 
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harm will accrue.  Such regulation prevents the accumulation of the 
large number of tiny indiscernible effects that would otherwise grow 
together to constitute a deadly environmental effect. 
This strategy, however, is possible only if the authorities refuse to 
limit their justifying restrictions to imminent and directly traceable 
harm, in other words, harm that accrues immediately from each 
individual’s actions.  As Cass Sunstein points out, “regulators often act 
without the slightest hesitation even though the benefits of their action 
will not be immediate; indeed, such benefits might occur many years in 
the future (as in the case of climate change).”8  They have to do so 
because waiting until the harm was imminent would make abatement 
impossible. 
Maybe Sunstein is too optimistic about regulators’ attitudes to 
harms of this kind.  Many environmentalists are far from convinced that 
the politics of regulation can deal with what they call “slow threats,” i.e., 
situations “where small, hardly noticeable changes add up over time to 
produce large impacts.” 9  The time scale may be decades or generations.  
It is not easy to factor the pacing of such threats into the frameworks of 
modern politics.  Their accrual involves “time periods that historians 
regularly deal with, but that stretch out beyond the time frame in which 
governments make budgets or do strategic planning.”10  Such threats 
may be mentioned occasionally in newscasts or op-eds when 
a major research report is published or some disaster occurs, 
but they seldom reach the level of sustained visibility and 
concern they deserve.  Without that awareness and sense of 
alarm, the problems are likely to continue worsening until 
their impacts become severe and obvious, stressing our ability 
to respond, or, in the worst cases, passing tipping points 
where no amount of effort can prevent catastrophic impacts.11  
* 
The “Slow Threats” literature shows that progress in regulatory 
approach is still patchy.  It seems to be particularly problematic in 
regulating social harm—especially pervasive social harm that accrues 
from the accumulation of large numbers of relatively small-scale 
phenomena, such as individual speech acts, interactions, and 
aggressions.  
 
 8 Cass R. Sunstein, Does the Clear and Present Danger Test Survive Cost-Benefit 
Analysis?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1775, 1777 (2019). 
 9 Robert L. Olson & David Rejeski, Slow Threats and Environmental Policy, 48 ENVTL. 
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10116, 10116–17 (2018). 
 10 Id. at 10117.  
 11 Id. at 10116–17. 
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One area where accumulating harm has been taken seriously 
concerns the accumulation of small-scale but visible damage to 
buildings and vehicles and its effects on the overall morale of urban 
neighborhoods.  The “broken windows” theory was put forward by 
George Kelling and James Q. Wilson in a 1982 article,12 in which they 
argued that visible signs on the streets of lack of repair—things like a 
broken window, a pile of uncollected garbage, damaged furniture, or an 
abandoned car—were likely to attract further disorder and crime 
because they signified to anyone interested that social controls were 
weak or attenuated at that locale.13  No single item would lead to this 
effect, but an accumulation, even a slow accumulation of such damage 
over time, would transform the atmosphere on that block or in that 
neighborhood.  
Now some commentators have made a direct connection between 
the broken windows theory and the damage wrought by hate speech.  
Gregory Rodriguez says that “[h]ate speech is a form of vandalism.  It 
defaces the environment, and like a broken window, if left untended, 
signals to other hoodlums that the coast is clear to do more damage.”14  
Maybe this is how some of the harm from hate speech comes about.  And 
sometimes it may be intentional.  Frank Collin, the leader of the Nazis 
who marched through Skokie in a famous incident from the 1970s said: 
“We want to reach the good people—get the fierce anti-Semites who 
have to live among the Jews to come out of the woodwork and stand up 
for themselves.”15  The idea was that timid anti-Semites would feel safer 
expressing themselves publicly in a social atmosphere already 
vandalized by Collin’s neo-Nazi followers parading with foul and 
provocative signs (“Hitler should have finished the job,” etc.).  But there 
are also broader modes of the accumulation of social harm that are more 
akin to the slow-acting poison hypothesis that regulators use in 
understanding environmental threats.  
As I have indicated, developing an appropriate regulatory response 
to the harm done by hate speech is made difficult by the iconic status of 
the “clear and present danger” test in First Amendment law and politics.  
I suspect the currency of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s formulation indicates 
that some of us are still in the grip of primitive thinking in some of what 
 
 12 George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 
1982, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/30
4465/. 
 13 This language is adapted from my article, Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and 
Community, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 371, 386 (2000). 
 14 Gregory Rodriguez, Vandalized by Speech, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, at A13.  
 15 PHILIPPA STRUM, WHEN THE NAZIS CAME TO SKOKIE 15 (1999); see JEREMY WALDRON, 
HARM IN HATE SPEECH 95 (2012).  
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we say about hate speech and the harm it causes.  According to Holmes, 
it is permissible to “punish speech that produces . . . a clear and 
imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive 
evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent. . . . It is 
only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about 
that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion 
. . . .”16  The reiteration of these requirements of fast-approaching 
danger—”clear and imminent,” danger “that it will bring about 
forthwith,” “the present danger of immediate evil”—raises doubts about 
the serviceability of Holmes’s doctrine in addressing slow threats and 
the accumulation of harm.  As I said in my book The Harm in Hate Speech,  
Imagine if we took that attitude toward environmental 
harms—toward automobile emissions, for example.  Suppose 
we said that unless someone can show that my automobile 
causes lead poisoning with direct detriment and imminent 
harm to the health of assignable individuals, I shouldn’t be 
required to fit an emission-control device to my car’s exhaust 
pipe.  It would be irresponsible to reason in that way with 
regard to environmental regulation; instead we figure that the 
tiny impacts of millions of actions—each apparently 
inconsiderable in itself—can produce a large-scale toxic effect 
that, even at the mass level, operates insidiously as a sort of 
slow-acting poison, and that regulations have to be aimed at 
individual actions with that scale and that pace of causation in 
mind.17  
Why then is it sensible to take that approach—looking only to 
macro-harms and their immediate causation—when we are considering 
social harm?  As Leslie Kendrick observes, “[t]he clear and present 
danger standard limits itself to acute situations, where particular 
expression is highly likely to have an immediate, demonstrable 
impact.”18  It would not cover “speech that erodes democratic ideals 
gradually—speech that promotes anti-Semitism and racial hatred,” for 
example.19  “Repeated, corrosive exposure causes harm by 
 
 16 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627–28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  The 
actual phrase “clear and present danger” came not from Abrams but from the slightly 
later case of Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).  “The question in every case 
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to 
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
the United States Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and 
degree.”  Id.  
 17 WALDRON, supra note 15 at 97 (emphasis in original). 
 18 Leslie Kendrick, On “Clear and Present Danger”, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653,  
1665–66 (2019). 
 19 Id. at 1666.  
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accumulation,” says Kendrick, but “[a] literal reading of Holmes’s . . . 
opinions would suggest that such harms are not the type of emergency 
that justifies suppression.”20  
How does all this apply to hate speech?  Doctrinally, Kendrick’s 
difficulty with the clear and present danger test is difficult to see 
because those who favor restricting hate speech sometimes argue as 
though such speech is per se valueless.  On that argument, the “clear and 
present danger” test would not apply at all, since hate speech would be 
in the same category as obscenity or constitutionally unprotected 
defamation.21  And indeed the Supreme Court in Beauharnais v. Illinois 
suggested that hate speech might be put in this category by being 
considered as group defamation.22  This certainly provides an 
alternative to the clear and present danger test, but the alternative does 
not require us to vary our mode of consequential analysis to include 
non-imminent threats.  In fact, defenders of hate speech regulation have 
sometimes been willing to pursue both lines of argument.  Thus, on the 
one hand, the racist pamphlet at issue in Beauharnais was classified as 
a group libel.  On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter was also willing to 
approach the issue of consequential harm by making a powerful 
argument about social atmospherics—the danger of “exacerbat[ing] 
tension between races.”23 
Illinois did not have to . . . await the tragic experience of the 
last three decades to conclude that wilful purveyors of 
falsehood concerning racial and religious groups promote 
strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold 
adjustments required for free, ordered life in a metropolitan, 
polyglot community.24 
The either/or here was not valueless speech versus a showing of clear 
and present danger; it was valueless speech versus a showing of harm, 
which might include either clear and present danger or slow-acting 
harm to the social environment.  
 
 
 20 Id. at 1667. 
 21 See Tom Hentoff, Speech, Harm, and Self-Government: Understanding the Ambit of 
the Clear and Present Danger Test, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1462–63 (1991).  
 22 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (“Libelous utterances not 
being within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either for 
us or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind the phrase ‘clear and present 
danger.’ Certainly no one would contend that obscene speech, for example, may be 
punished only upon a showing of such circumstances. Libel . . . is in the same class.”). 
 23 Id. at 259.  
 24 Id. at 258–59. 
WALDRON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  10:59 PM 
232 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:225 
This consequential analysis is certainly what the best-drafted hate 
speech statutes around the world seem to be looking to capture.  The 
United Kingdom’s Public Order Act looks at the speaker’s intention “to 
stir up racial hatred.”25  The German Penal Code and the Canadian Penal 
Code are concerned with the incitement of hatred, the New Zealand 
Human Rights Act punishes words “likely to excite hostility,” and so on.26  
All of these measures seem to be concerned with the effect of hate 
speech in poisoning the atmosphere in which diverse groups are 
expected to live together.  
I suppose one could parse such statutes in a spirit of strict 
individualism: one could interpret them as prohibiting one person, X, 
from stirring up hatred in the mind of another person, Y, against a third 
person, Z.  But the hatred that the legislators are concerned about seems 
to diffuse community-wide hatred against members of a large (albeit 
minority) group defined by race, religion, or national origin rather than 
hatred focused on particular individuals.  The hatred itself is mentioned 
as something abstract, spread directly and indirectly among members 
of the audience to whom the message of hate is delivered.  And it makes 
sense to understand the offense as a person doing something—in 
circumstances in which others are likely to be doing it too—so that what 
 
 25 Public Order Act 1986, c. 64, § 18 (1) (Eng.) (“A person who uses threatening, 
abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays any written material which is 
threatening, abusive or insulting, is guilty of an offence if—(a) he intends thereby to stir 
up racial hatred, or (b) having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be 
stirred up thereby.”) (emphasis added).  
26  STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], § 130(1), translation at, https://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html (Ger.) (“Whosoever, in a manner that 
is capable of disturbing the public peace 1. incites hatred against segments of the 
population or calls for violent or arbitrary measures against them; or 2. assaults the 
human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning, or defaming segments of 
the population, shall be punished with imprisonment from three months to five years.” 
(emphasis added)); Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46 § 319(1) (Can.) (“Everyone who, 
by communicating statements in any public place, incites hatred against any identifiable 
group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace is guilty of (a) an 
indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years” 
(emphasis added)); Human Rights Act 1993, s 61(1) (N.Z.) (“It shall be unlawful for any 
person—(a) to publish or distribute written matter which is threatening, abusive, or 
insulting, or to broadcast by means of radio or other electronic communication words 
which are threatening, abusive, or insulting; or (b) to use in any public place . . . or at any 
meeting to which the public are invited or have access, words which are threatening, 
abusive, or insulting; or (c) to use in any place words which are threatening, abusive, or 
insulting if the person using the words knew or ought to have known that the words 
were reasonably likely to be published in a newspaper, magazine, or periodical or 
broadcast by means of radio or television,—being matter or words likely to excite 
hostility against or bring into contempt any group of persons in or who may be coming to 
New Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group 
of persons” (emphasis added)). 
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has to be considered from the legislators’ point of view is the effect of 
this one incident of hate speech alongside lots of other such incidents in 
society at large.  Of course, one act of individual hate speech may fizzle 
out without any larger social effect, like one of the ratty little pamphlets 
that Holmes alluded to in Abrams.27  But before we can dismiss it in that 
way, we must be sure that its apparent harmlessness is not an illusion 
born of the assumption that long-term social degradation does not 
matter.  
The long-term threat envisaged in this legislation is the stirring up 
and spreading of hatred and contempt, of hostility against and between 
various groups in society.  In any diverse society, inter-communal 
hostility and the undermining of social peace is one of the things most 
to be dreaded.  Once it comes into existence, it is very hard to roll back.  
One need only think of Hindu-Muslim antipathy in India, for example, 
or, for much of the twentieth century, hatred between Nationalist 
(Catholic) and Loyalist (Protestant) communities in Northern Ireland.  
Or consider the effects of immigration.  The New Zealand provision 
mentioned earlier makes an explicit connection to the social tensions 
that might arise out of an influx of immigrants; it talks of “words likely 
to excite hostility against or bring into contempt any group of persons 
in or who may be coming to New Zealand.”28  The authorities have to pay 
attention to such possibilities.  Those responsible for the well-being of a 
society cannot view this with indifference or, given the mode of its 
causation, postpone dealing with it until the onset of its worst effects is 
imminent. 
One can also look at the issue of social atmospherics in a more 
positive light.  Think of Justice Frankfurter’s modest formulation in 
Beauharnais: “the manifold adjustments required for free, ordered life 
in a metropolitan, polyglot community.”29  These adjustments define for 
us the deep ecology of respect, tolerance, and inclusion in our society.  
We are diverse in our ethnicities, our race, and our religion.  And we are 
embarked on a grand experiment of living and working together within 
and despite these differences.  Each group must accept that society is 
not just for them, but it is for them too, along with all the others.  And 
each person, each member of each group, should be able to go about his 
or her business with the assurance that there will be no need to face 
hostility, violence, discrimination, or exclusion by others.  When this 
assurance is conveyed effectively, it is hardly noticeable; it is something 
on which everyone can rely, we hope, like relying on the cleanness of the 
 
 27 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 28 Human Rights Act 1993, s 61(1) (N.Z.) (emphasis added). 
 29 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 259 (1952).  
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air they breathe or the quality of the water they drink from a fountain.  
This sense of security in the space we all inhabit is a public good, and in 
a decent society, it is something that we all contribute to and help 
sustain in an instinctive and almost unnoticeable way.  Hate speech 
undermines this public good, or it makes the task of sustaining it much 
more difficult than it would otherwise be.30  
This is best stated by Bhikhu Parekh, a British political theorist and 
member of the House of Lords: 
Hate speech . . . lowers the tone of public debate, coarsens the 
society’s moral sensibility, and weakens the culture of mutual 
respect that lies at the heart of a good society. . . . It creates 
barriers of mistrust and hostility between individuals and 
groups, plants fears, obstructs normal relations between 
them, and in general exercises a corrosive influence on the 
conduct of collective life.31 
Ultimately the impact is on individuals, as public expressions of hatred 
change the character of the environment in which they must live and 
work.  In R. v. Keegstra (1990), the Canadian Chief Justice Brian Dickson 
said this about the effect that public expressions of hatred may have on 
people’s lives:  
The derision, hostility and abuse encouraged by hate 
propaganda . . . have a severely negative impact on the 
individual’s sense of self-worth and acceptance.  This impact 
may cause target group members to take drastic measures in 
reaction, perhaps avoiding activities which bring them into 
contact with non-group members or adopting attitudes and 
postures directed towards blending in with the majority.  Such 
consequences bear heavily in a nation that prides itself on 
tolerance and the fostering of human dignity through, among 
other things, respect for the many racial, religious and cultural 
groups in our society.32 
A hateful atmosphere stigmatizes members of vulnerable groups, 
contributing, as Parekh puts it, to “a climate in which, over time, some 
groups come to be demonized and their discriminatory treatment is 
accepted as normal.”33  Parekh points out the obtuseness of working 
with a Holmesian standard in this area.  “[H]arm,” he says,  
is not easy to define, identify and prove. A relentless decline in 
the society’s climate of mutual respect is a case of serious 
harm, but it does not point to specific individuals. . . .[.[A]n 
 
 30 This paragraph is adapted from WALDRON, supra note 15, at 4.  
 31 Bhikhu Parekh, Limits of Free Speech, 45 PHILOSOPHIA 931, 932 (2017). 
 32 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R 697 (Can.). 
 33 Parekh, supra note 31, at 933. 
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isolated case of hate speech can be taken in one’s stride. But 
over time such remark [sic] create a climate that might be 
deeply offensive and unacceptable. 34  
“Vicious and widespread hatred of a group does not spring up 
overnight.”35  This is clearly danger, but it is not “present” danger in 
Holmes’s sense.  Like any of the slow threats we described earlier, it 
“builds up slowly, through isolated utterances and actions, each perhaps 
trivial individually but all cumulatively capable of coarsening the 
community’s sensibility.”36  
I think this is what we ought to be addressing in our thinking about 
hate speech.  It is true that in Abrams v. United States, Holmes gave voice 
to a rightly celebrated dissent.  But he did not leave us with the doctrines 
we needed in order to think sensibly about this kind of harm generated 
in this kind of way.  
* 
I want to end with some thoughts about the acceptance or lack of 
acceptance of this kind of argument.  In debates about hate speech—at 
least in the United States—whenever I make a case for paying attention 
to slow-building atmospheric harm of the sort described here, I am 
confronted with immediate skepticism.  Audiences flatly insist that we 
must stick with something like the “clear and present danger” approach 
and they will barely countenance any other approach to the causation of 
harm.  And so, I wonder, what explains this insistent reliance on 
Holmes’s standard when its use would make little sense in other areas 
of regulation?  Why this blind loyalty to what seems like a crude and 
outdated understanding of the way harm accrues and the way it may be 
regulated? 
The sense I get is that people fear some trick; they suspect this is 
not real causation at all, just something that progressives say to one 
another to justify restrictions on liberty.  For—they say—it cannot 
possibly be the case that hate speech causes harm in this sort of way.  Or 
if it does, the harm in question need not be taken seriously since it is not 
an outbreak of fighting or anything like that.   
Occasionally one hears an acknowledgment that harm of this kind 
does exist, but the acknowledgment is coupled quickly with a refusal to 
be moved by it: hate speech is said to be protected constitutionally “not 
because we doubt the speech inflicts harm, but because we fear the 
 
 34 Id. at 934–35. 
 35 Id. at 933. 
 36 Id. 
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censorship more.”37  This at least is candid, compared with the usual line 
of magical thinking: because speech is constitutionally protected, it 
simply cannot be the case that hate speech causes harm in this way.   
The latter is an outcome-driven argument.  And one hears a lot of it 
in these debates about free speech.  It is said, for example, that 
degradation of the social environment of the sort that I have been 
talking about must not be counted as harm.  To regard it as harm would 
be implicitly to undermine the status of free speech as a constitutional 
right.  So, conversely, a full-blooded commitment to free speech as a 
constitutional right has to mean setting one’s face against this sort of 
harm.  I have found this a common response to my identification of a 
dignitarian dimension to the harm wrought by hate speech.  It is said 
that the recognition of dignity as a legitimate interest is a sort of Trojan 
horse,38 or (to vary the metaphor) it sets us on a slippery slope toward 
a European-style understanding of rights.  Recognizing that dignity is at 
stake means admitting considerations of proportionality and balance 
into the rights equation.  Such considerations, it is thought, undermine 
the distinctively principled character of American constitutional 
rights.39  So, as good Americans, we must blind ourselves to the effect of 
hate speech on human dignity: that’s the upshot of the first line of 
argument.  
Or it is said that the model of causation I am using is inherently 
opposed to free speech as a constitutional right.  No one who believes in 
free speech will be willing to accept that harm can accrue in the way that 
I have been suggesting.  It is a mark of one’s allegiance to the principle 
of free speech that one repudiates such a model of causation.  This too is 
outcome-driven; we don’t like the argument’s outcome, so we infer that 
there must be something wrong with the structure of its causal analysis. 
I think this sort of outcome-driven rejection of the slow-threat 
model of causation is unfortunate.  Apart from anything else, discussions 
of it in the free speech arena almost invariably ignore the widely 
accepted use of such models elsewhere in public regulation.  Professor 
Blasi’s fine essay in this volume on the Holmesian response to claims 
about remote harm makes no mention whatsoever of the emissions or 
 
 37 Michael W. McConnell, You Can’t Say That, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/books/review/the-harm-in-hate-speech-by-
jeremy-waldron.html. 
 38 Guy Carmi, Dignity—The Enemy from Within: A Theoretical and Comparative 
Analysis of Human Dignity as a Free Speech Justification, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 957, 958 
(2007).  
 39 See Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. 
EUR. L. 201 (2008). 
WALDRON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  10:59 PM 
2020] STATE INSPECTION 237 
other environmental examples.40  It treats remote causation in the 
context of speech as though it were sui generis and as though the model 
of causation could be evaluated without reference to its use in any other 
domain or (to put it perhaps unfairly) as though these matters could be 
discussed without venturing beyond the confines of regulatory theory 
circa 1919. 
And anyway, there is no reason for free speech advocates to be 
opposed in principle to this sort of causal model.  On the contrary, 
something like it—the long-term and cumulative effect of lots of small-
scale interactions—is often invoked in defense of free speech.  Holmes’s 
“free trade in ideas” conception—”the best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market”41—
relies on it.  That conception invites us to consider speech acts not in and 
of themselves individually, but in a vast number of market-like 
interactions with hundreds of other speech acts, building upon and 
responding to one another, filtering out falsehoods and dead ends.  
Truth, if it emerges here, is a benefit but not a clear and present one; it 
is the result of complex sifting and accumulation.  
Something similar is also involved on the negative side when 
thinkers like John Stuart Mill and his modern followers worry about the 
accumulation of conformist tendencies into “so great a mass of 
influences hostile to Individuality.”42  We hear an echo of it too in a 
recent open letter published in Harper’s Magazine about the impact of 
“cancel culture”:  
Editors are fired for running controversial pieces; books are 
withdrawn for alleged inauthenticity; journalists are barred 
from writing on certain topics; professors are investigated for 
quoting works of literature in class; a researcher is fired for 
circulating a peer-reviewed academic study; and the heads of 
organizations are ousted for what are sometimes just clumsy 
mistakes.  Whatever the arguments around each particular 
incident, the result has been to steadily narrow the 
boundaries of what can be said without the threat of 
reprisal. . . .This stifling atmosphere will ultimately harm the 
most vital causes of our time.43 
Each of the incidents alluded to might seem like an outrage to the 
freedom of those affected.  But the letter is mostly concerned with the 
overall tendency of hundreds of such instances and the resultant 
 
 40 See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
 41 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 42 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 132 (2nd ed. 1859). 
 43 A Letter on Justice and Open Debate, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, July 7, 2020, 
https://harpers.org/a-letter-on-justice-and-open-debate/. 
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atmosphere.  It ill behooves anyone who deploys the model of 
atmospheric accumulation in this way to denounce it as such when it is 
used by their opponents.  I don’t mean this as a simple tu quoque.  One 
person might use the cumulation of small effects to make a case in favor 
of restrictions on speech, and one may also use the cumulation of other 
small effects to make a case against such restrictions.  The fact that it is 
used on one side does not mean that exception cannot be taken to (e.g. 
the empirics of) its use on the other side.  My point is simply that 
arguments of this kind should not be ruled out, out of hand.  
All that said, it is important to acknowledge that these claims about 
atmospheric harms are not self-verifying.  The power of the analogy 
with auto emissions that I began with doesn’t make them true.  Maybe 
the empirical evidence that hate speech leads to a slow accrual of harm 
is less convincing than it is in the auto emissions analogy.  Jacob 
Mchangama, for example, says that “[w]hile we know for certain that the 
cumulative effect of automobile exhaust causes harmful pollution that 
can be averted with emission controls, we cannot with any degree of 
certainty know that the cumulative effect of hate speech results in 
‘environmental’ harm avoidable by restricting free speech.”44   
It’s a fair point.  In other contexts, we might be quite skeptical of 
such claims about the accrual of harm.  Suppose someone were to use 
the environmental analogy to justify prosecutions for sedition.  (That, 
after all, was the real issue in the Abrams case.)  Would defenders of 
restrictions on hate speech be willing to countenance defenses of the 
regulation of sedition—the prosecution of apparent trivialities like Mr. 
Abrams’s “silly leaflet”45—on the ground that hundreds of such 
publications might add up over time to a genuine threat to national 
security?  We must be sure that in our enthusiasm for considering this 
form of causation we do not give carte blanche to every alleged instance 
of the form.   
Also, it is important to acknowledge that arguments for restricting 
hate speech based on slow causation are inherently vulnerable to the 
objection that more speech can always be inserted into the public debate 
to obviate long-term atmospheric threats.  “If there be time to expose 
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the 
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not 
 
 44 Jacob Mchangama, The Harm in Hate Speech Laws, HOOVER INST. POL’Y REV. (Dec. 
2012), https://www.hoover.org/research/harm-hate-speech-laws (reviewing  
WALDRON, supra note 15). 
 45 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628.  
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enforced silence.”46  There is nothing in the mode of causation that I have 
been considering that rules out the possibility that countervailing 
speech might make such a difference.  And there is nothing equivalent 
in the emissions analogy.   
On the other hand, how we think about harm makes a difference in 
the way we treat the point about countervailing speech.  The point about 
countervailing speech might easily be exaggerated, especially in a 
context where the hate speech in question is supposed to wreak its 
damage atmospherically rather than persuasively.47  Defenders of free 
speech want the countervailing speech hypothesis to be true.  But its 
common treatment as just something effective to say when concerns are 
voiced about the slow accumulation of harm hardly indicates that the 
prospect of that accumulation is being taken seriously. 
 
 46 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring with 
Holmes, J.). 
 47 See also Note, Clear and Present Danger Re-Examined, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 98, 106 
(1951) (“[I]ndividuals vary in their degree of openmindedness. It would therefore seem 
that decisive significance can hardly be attached to the mere opportunity for free 
discussion, since the consequences of such an opportunity are variant and relatively 
unpredictable.”). 
